SIRIA - DEMOCRATIZANDO?
"...The reformers' claim that the Arab-Israeli conflict is being used by the regime
as an excuse to tighten the reigns on the intellectuals. Dr. Ali Diyab, Head of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ba'ath Party responded, "This conflict is a real thing
that cannot be ignored. The leadership and the state determine many issues in light of the
conflict. Every economic, social or political measure must, at the end of the day,
contribute to the solidity of Syria's position [in the conflict] and strengthen it; on the
other hand, any initiative that weakens national unity and harms [these] efforts, serves
the Zionist enemy."
"...Until last week, the reformers in Syria operated with almost complete freedom,
and enjoyed media coverage and a sympathetic atmosphere. But, once the Alawites felt that
the reformers were endangering the regime's survival - it changed overnight. The regime's
latest measures indicate its intention to nip this development in the bud, because it is
capable of
undermining its legitimacy. The reformer's determination has not yet faced any real
test..."
Uma análise da abertura, bem lenta e gradual, da Síria.
The Syrian Regime vs. the Reformers
Part I: Backlash, The Regime Fights Back - By Yotam Feldner*
INTRODUCTION
Since Bashar Assad became president of Syria in July 2000, and especially over the last
few months, Syrian intellectuals in Damascus and other cities have begun publicly
discussing the development of"civil society" in Syria. Some
seventy"dialogue clubs" were established throughout Syria, and the fact that the
security apparatuses did not crack down on them, strengthened the Arab media's assessment
that President Bashar supports these activities and the goals of the reformers. (1)
However, in an interview with the London-based daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (February 8, 2001),
the Syrian president ended this speculation. He limited the political debate in Syria to a
discussion of the past, and opposed the discussion of possible changes in the future. He
also stated that when discussing the past, one must refrain from criticizing the Ba'ath
Party, thus rendering political discussion futile. Furthermore, President Bashar
threatened that whoever endangers the interests of the state will be severely punished,
even if their intentions were good.(2)
The Syrian president's remarks were a green light for those opposing democratic and civil
reform in Syria, especially in the Ba'ath Party and internal security apparatuses, to
launch an attack on the reformers and their ideas.
This battle occurred on several levels. On the ideological level, Ba'ath Party officials
were instructed to attend the reformers' meetings and to debate and refute their ideas. On
the administrative level, special regulations were set to limit the reformers' activities.
On the personal level, legal measures were taken against one of the leaders of the
reformers, a member of the"The People's Council" (Syria's Parliament.)
BA'ATH OFFICIALS JOIN IN THE IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE
The regime's campaign began with Ba'ath officials joining in on some of the meetings; most
of the debates between Ba'athists and the reformers took place in Parliament Member (MP),
Riyadh Al-Seif's home where he hosted a weekly political debate club that had received
most of the media's attention.(3) The Arab media reported that Ba'ath members were
instructed to participate by the party's national leadership. One source even reported
that these Ba'athists were reprimanded by the regime for not making a strong enough case.
The scolded Ba'athists responded that they were not given enough time to present their
positions.(4)
Chairman of the Faculty Association at the University of Damascus, Dr. Feysal Kulthoum,
was the highest-ranking Ba'ath official to participate in the meetings. Dr. Kulthoum, a
professor of constitutional law, claimed that he participated of his own free
will:"We are not robots. We are not like the communist party in the Soviet Union,
whose members were controlled by the leadership. We began our activities out of a strong
national feeling that the public must be made aware of the dangers [in the activities of
the intellectuals].. My goal," added Dr. Kulthoum,"was to refute those arguments
that do not correspond with the Arab-Israeli conflict and Syria's role in the
region." Dr. Kulthoum said that although he participated in the symposiums - they are
illegitimate:"No one should be allowed to participate in undermining the legitimacy
of the [Syrian] regime, or to deviate from the national and pan-Arab goals set by
it."(5)
At the same time, members of the national leadership of the Ba'ath Party launched a
campaign in university departments, to thwart the initiatives of the intellectuals. This
was accompanied by an incitement campaign against the intellectuals by Imams in Syrian
mosques. One Imam in the city of Tartus even compared the intellectuals' demands to the
demand for civil marriages.(6)
The Syrian leadership itself joined in the ideological debate and several high-level
leaders were sent to brief various state institutions about the appropriate ideological
line.(7) Vice President Abd Al-Halim Khaddam, briefed the staff of the University of
Damascus and then continued on to the University of Homs. The other Vice President, Zoheir
Masharqa updated the Ba'ath leadership in Aleppo. Deputy Secretary of the Ba'ath Party,
Abdallah Al-Ahmar, met with the faculty of the University of Aleppo. Foreign Minister
Faruq Al-Shar' briefed the writers, journalists and media. Head of the National Security
Apparatus, Muhammad Sa'id Bakhitan briefed senior officials in the various internal
security apparatuses, while Prime Minister Mustafa Miro updated the professional unions in
the fields of trade, agriculture and industry in Damascus. Suddenly, it seemed, the Ba'ath
Party leadership was seized with panic.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATIONS TO LIMIT ACTIVITIES
Administrative steps aimed at limiting the reformers' activities accompanied the
ideological campaign. The Syrian security authorities laid down five conditions to
regulate the activities of the "dialogue clubs:"
1)A request for a permit from the security apparatuses. The request must be submitted to
the district governor, 15 days before the convening of any meeting.
2)A copy of the lecture and the name of the lecturer.
3)A list of the names of participants should be provided as well.
4)The location of the meeting and the name of the host. (8)
5)The"Syrian political security apparatus" would be responsible for issuing
permits, and the decisions would be made in its central office in Damascus"in order
to regulate and organize the matter."(9)
The intellectuals, for their part, said that they are prepared to report" to the
Syrian Ministry of Information, but not to any other element," thus undermining the
legitimacy of the involvement of the Syrian internal security apparatuses in the
supervision of their activities.(10) Habib Saleh, who led the"Tartus Free Club for
Democratic National Dialogue," said. That the conditions set forth by the security
apparatuses"are excessive, because of the difficulty of reporting in advance the
names of the participants in meetings that are open to the public."(11) In the city
of Al-Qamishli, for example, the lecture planned at the local club was canceled after the
head of the Political Security Apparatus in town insulted and
beat two of the organizers, poet Marwan Othman and writer Muhammad Amin Muhammad, for
apologizing to the invitees for the delay in notifying of the cancellation. Official
sources reported, on the other hand, that the scuffle broke out following a verbal
argument between the two sides.(12) Meanwhile, writer, Muhammad Najati Tayara, who headed
the dialogue club in Homs,
was invited to Damascus to"discuss" with a security apparatus official the
activities of the club.(13)
PERSONAL MEASURES
The Syrian authorities also took action against one of the key figures among the
reformers, Syrian MP Riyadh Al-Seif. A criminal investigation was opened against Al-Seif
who, as an MP, attracted most of the media's attention. Parliament Chairman Abd Al-Qader
Qaddura reported to the parliament:"I authorized, based on my authority under the
law, opening an investigation against MP Riyadh Al-Seif." The Syrian Minister of
Justice made the request to open the investigation. Al-Seif himself told the media that he
was charged with a"constitutional breach."(14)
MP Munzir Musalli explained that Al-Seif violated the constitution by stating"The
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party monopolized the government and granted itself the right to
lead the society and the state using Leftist rhetoric." This remark, Musalli
explained, contradicts Article 8 of the Syrian constitution, which states"The Ba'ath
Party is the leader of the society and the state." Musalli justified the decision to
open an investigation against his colleague Al-Seif by saying"The Ba'ath Party did
not take a monopoly over the government; the right [to rule] is given to it in Article 8
of the constitution which was approved by a referendum."(15)
Part II: The Battle of Ideas - By Yotam Feldner*
Limiting of Individual Freedoms by the Regime
Ba'ath Party officials fiercely criticized the reformer's demands for broader freedoms in
Syria. Syrian Vice President, Abd Al-Halim Khaddam, explained: "Freedom is not
absolute, but rather a relative concept. This is the case all over the world. No citizen
anywhere has the right to endanger the foundations of his society."1
As is often done in modern autocratic regimes, which use the theoretical models of Western
democracy to justify the opposite, Vice President Khaddam stated: "Individual's right
to freedom ends where the freedom of another individual begins, and where the stability
and security of the society begin...."2 At another point he stated, "We support
freedom...
Limitation of freedom contradicts human
nature, and can eliminate creativity and progress. However... democracy is not a
pre-tailored suit... freedom must not collide with national unity, or with state security
and stability."3 Dr. Feysal Kulthoum who played a key role in the Ba'ath campaign,
broadened the theoretical scope on the issue of individual human rights. According to him,
there are two types of legitimacy: one type which is a "group of principles and
ideological goals upon which the [Syrian national] leadership is based, first and foremost
among them, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the domestic national missions, that is,
building the state and the national unity." This type of legitimacy claims Dr.
Kulthoum, has priority over the second type, which concerns "elements of equality,
freedom and respect of property rights." The second type of legitimacy Kulthoum
demanded must adjust itself to the national goals determined by the regime.4
Therefore, the limitation of rights in Syria is legitimate, as long as it serves
the ideological principles of the Ba'ath regime.
Domestic Stability vs. the "Syrian Mosaic"
An additional claim raised by the Ba'athists was that political pluralism will
"undermine Syria's stability." Deputy General Secretary of the national
leadership of the Ba'ath Party, Suleiman Kaddah, said that "talking again about the
national and religious 'mosaic' in Syria will lead to the disintegration of the society
and will harm [the state's] security and stability."5
The term "national mosaic" is taken from a communique published by the leading
figure in the reform camp and member of the Syrian Parliament Riyadh Al-Seif which stated
that "the mosaic of religions and ethnic groups in Syria must be granted their
rights."6 The "national mosaic" implies the recognition of the political
weight of Syria's various ethnic groups. For the Syrian regime, which is dominated by the
'Alawi minority, this demand is a real existential threat. The fear of undermining
"Syria's stability" is, in fact, a fear of undermining the legitimacy of the
'Alawi rule. Vice President Khaddam addressed this point and warned of the disintegration
of national unity into various ethnic elements, each one of which,
"according to the intellectuals", has its own culture.7 According to Khaddam,
the use of the term "national mosaic" is an attempt by the US and the West, to
shatter Third World countries into pieces by demanding the self-determination of their
different ethnic groups. "Even if the person who demanded this is an ignoramus,"
he said, "whoever invented it knew the meaning of this term and what it
implies."8 Khaddam envisioned a pessimistic future for Syria if it responds to this
demand: "Are there any conflicts between people in Syria today? Are people fighting
one another? Do the intellectuals want people to fight one another?...Is the alternative
what happened in Algeria, Yugoslavia or Somalia?...We will under no circumstances let
Syria turn into Algeria or Yugoslavia."9
The demand to grant Syria's "national mosaic" its rights was apparently the
straw that broke the camel's back. Dr. Ali Diyab, Head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of
the Ba'ath Party, explained that the intellectuals "strayed from the fundamental
national principles and from the constitution by presenting Syria as a mosaic of
nationalities and religions and by calling for the disqualification of the principle that
the Ba'ath party is the leader of the state and the society." The intellectuals were
given the opportunity to play an important role, without harming the fundamental
principles, but they deviated from the legitimate path. 10
Stability vs. Anarchy
Between the "stability" granted to Syria by the Ba'ath Party, and the
"revolutions and occupation" that preceded its reign. The choice, therefore, is
between anarchy and stability. Undermining the Ba'ath regime will inevitably lead the
country back to anarchy. Deputy Secretary General of the National Leadership of the Ba'ath
Party, Suleiman Kaddah, warned: "Part of what has been proposed by a number of
people, is aimed at returning Syria to the Mandate period or to the era of revolutions, to
instability and weakness. In those days, Syria was a country that foreigners fought over.
On the other hand, thanks to the leader, Hafez Assad, Syria has become a regional power,
as our enemies admit even before our friends do."11 Patriotism vs. Neglect of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Arab-Israeli conflict is a cornerstone of the Ba'ath Party in Syria. Dr. Feysal
Kulthoum described this conflict as one of the "goals and principles on which the
regime is based." In their communique, the reformers did not comment on the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Ba'athists used it to question their patriotism: "Was
it mere coincidence that the reformers proposals did not include a single word about the
Arab-Israeli conflict?" Vice President Khaddam asked. "Can any Syrian or Arab
citizen's life be separated from what goes on in the conflict between the Arabs and
Israel?" 12
The reformers' claim that the Arab-Israeli conflict is being used by the regime as an
excuse to tighten the reigns on the intellectuals. Dr. Ali Diyab, Head of the Foreign
Affairs Bureau of the Ba'ath Party responded, "This conflict is a real thing that
cannot be ignored. The leadership and the state determine many issues in light of the
conflict. Every economic, social or political measure must, at the end of the day,
contribute to the solidity of Syria's position [in the conflict] and strengthen it; on the
other hand, any initiative that weakens national unity and harms [these] efforts, serves
the Zionist enemy."13
Vice President Khaddam echoed President Bashar's statement about possible
"innocent" misbehavior. He stated that he does not accuse the intellectuals of
being agents of foreign countries, "but, even if their intentions are good - the way
to hell is still paved with good intentions."14
The Reformers and the Syrian Opposition in Exile
Veteran Syrian exiled dissidents all over the world expressed doubts about the survival of
the struggle for reform in Syria. Some of them did not have faith in the determination of
the reformers, and described them as motivated by personal interests and as being in
cooperation with the regime itself.
Dr. As'ad Naim, a Syrian scholar living in Sweden, wrote in the London-based Al-Quds
Al-Arabi daily, that the reformers emerged from within the governmental circles, and
looked down upon the veteran opposition groups who were persecuted by the regime. Dr. Naim
portrayed the intellectuals as spoiled elitists and said that they have no chance at
standing up to the challenges that the regime will place before them. He wrote, "This
political situation can be compared to a child who loves the woods, because there is
freedom there and no limitations by parents or school. At first, he is filled with
happiness and joy; he dances and shouts without answering to anyone. But then evening
comes, darkness falls, and strange voices pierce the silence; he hears the owl's call;
hunger overtakes him; cold penetrates his flesh and fear seizes him.
What can he do? These elitist intellectuals, who enjoy the media's attention and the
government's support, are bound to end up with a call to return to school, to their
parents' home and to the family, so that we can continue our lives as we lived them over
the last thirty years, God forbid."15 Muhammad Al-Hasnawi, a Syrian writer living in
London wrote about a woman, the mother of one of the political prisoners jailed in Syria,
who broke out in tears when she heard that Bashar Assad had inherited his father's reign.
"Her natural intuition," he wrote "taught her that the tragedy will
continue... Has this fact, which is understood by an illiterate woman, escaped the
attention of people like us, who want to lead the public opinion and the
modernization?" 16
Conclusion
Until last week, the reformers in Syria operated with almost complete freedom, and enjoyed
media coverage and a sympathetic atmosphere. But, once the Alawites felt that the
reformers were endangering the regime's survival - it changed overnight. The regime's
latest measures indicate its intention to nip this development in the bud, because it is
capable of undermining its legitimacy. The reformer's determination has not yet faced any
real test. However, the moment of truth is fast approaching.
*Yotam Feldner is MEMRI's Director of Media Analysis
Endnotes (part I):
(1)MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 47,"The Battle for Reforms and Civil
Society in Syria - Part I" February 9, 2001.
(2)MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 49,"All Quiet on the Eastern Front, Almost."
February 16, 2001 as well as Part 3 of the MEMRI translation of the interview with
President Bashar.
(3)Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
(4)Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
(5)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 17, 2001.
(6)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 17, 2001.
(7)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 16, 2001.
(8)Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
(9)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 20, 2001.
(10)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 17, 2001.
(11)Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
(12)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 20, 2001.
(13)Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 20, 2001.
(14)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 19, 2001.
(15)Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
Endnotes (part II)
1 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 18, 2001.
2 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 18, 2001.
3 Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 19, 2001.
4 Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 17, 2001.
5 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 17, 2001.
6 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
7 Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 19, 2001.
8 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 18, 2001.
9 Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 19, 2001.
10 Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), February 21, 2001.
11 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 17, 2001.
12 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 18, 2001.
13 Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), January 21, 2001.
14 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), February 19, 2001.
15 Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), February 19, 2001.
16 Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), February 20, 2001. |
